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Abstract: Based on the analysis of trade and policy reforms undertaken towards greater facilitation  
of trade and harmonization of rules, the paper evaluates the “thickness” of borders at the current stage 
of Georgia−EU cooperation. The study is focused on the trade component of the formal cooperation 
agreements between Georgia and EU. Trade flows as well as policy reforms are analyzed in order to 
evaluate how the significance of borders has changed. It reviews the steps taken by both parties to 
overcome national borders and create larger economic space for trade.  
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Streszczenie: Artykuł przedstawia ocenę szczelności granic na aktualnym etapie współpracy między 
Gruzją a WE przygotowaną w oparciu o analizę handlu i reform polityki handlowej. Przedstawione  
rozważania skupiają się na strumieniach handlu i polityce handlowej.   
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Introduction 
 
Research into the question of borders has been especially topical since 
the late 1990s and early 2000s in the context of intensified globalization and 
regionalization processes. In this context many authors1 evaluated national bor-
ders as increasingly open and transparent and even of diminishing economic 
importance. There are studies, which show, that borders sharply reduce trade 
volumes between countries2. Border effects on trade are presented by Obstfeld 
& Rogoff as one of the puzzles of international macroeconomics3. Anderson 
                                                          
1 K. Ohmae, The Borderless World, Harper Business, New York 1990.  
J. Sholte, Global Capitalism and the State, “International Affairs” , vol. 73, no. 3 July 1997, pp. 427-452. 
2 J. McCallum, National Borders Matter: Canada-U.S. Regional Trade Patterns,  “American Economic 
Review”, No 85, 1995, pp. 615-623.  
3 M. Obstfeld, K. Rogoff, The Six Major Puzzles in International Macroeconomics: Is There a Common 
Cause?, NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2000, Volume 15, edited by Ben S. Bernanke and Kenneth 
Rogoff, MIT Press, 2000, p. 339-412. 
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&Wincoop4. argue that border associated policies are very costly, even when 
formal barriers are low. Therefore despite globalization and regionalization pro-
cesses, trade costs still remain substantial5. Political borders translate into thick 
bands of trading costs and represent a critical exogenous force in the integration 
process6. Therefore integration even at the highest stage of its development is 
incomplete. 
Considering the above, from the economic standpoint borders have geo-
graphical dimension (boundaries within which states can perform their economic 
functions) and institutional dimension (policies, rules and mechanisms used to 
regulate cross-border flows of goods and services, capital and labour in their best 
national interests). National borders are changing under the pressure of regional 
and international trade agreements7. With this regard changes in borders are 
associated with changes in institutional arrangements towards other countries. At 
the multilateral level international economic integration is the manifestation of 
such changes through which countries seek to strengthen their economic linka-
ges with partner countries. In economics literature, integration traditionally has 
been associated with explicit government actions to lower tariffs and other artifi-
cial barriers to the international movement of goods, services, and input8 and it 
can be discussed as a complex of policy measures that reduce the thickness of 
borders9. 
The study relies on the official European and Georgian documents and po-
licy statements as well as statistical data analysis. The article is organized as 
follows: first we discuss the interrelations of borders and EU−Georgia trade rela-
tions against the background of trade policy reforms undertaken. Then we evalu-
ate trade-related institutional approximation and make a conclusion about the 
future steps that should be taken in order to increase permeability of borders and 
reach greater integration. 
 
Borders and Georgia−EU Bilateral Trade 
 
Borders are not merely lines separating states from each other. They re-
flect differences in institutions, policies and regulations which affect economic 
relations among countries. From the international economics and economic inte-
gration standpoint borders are viewed as obstacles to the smooth functioning of 
economic transactions. National borders can influence economic activity in a 
number of ways. They have economic, political and legal significance and provi-
de tools for governments to regulate international flows of goods, services, and 
                                                          
4 J.E. Anderson, E. van Wincoop, Borders,Trade and Welfare. Prepared for the Brookings Trade Forum 
2001 on Globalization: Issues and Implications, May 10-11, 2001. 
5 World Bank, Doing Business 2005, Retrieved from: http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/ 
Doing% 20Business/Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB15-Full-Report.pdf 
6 M. Fratianni, Borders and the Constraints on Globalization, 2004, Retrieved from: 
http://kelley.iu.edu/riharbau/RePEc/iuk/wpaper/bepp2004-05-fratianni.pdf 
7 Ibidem. 
8 J. Ceglowski, Has Globalization Created a Borderless World? Business Review, March April 1998, 
retrieved from file:///C:/Documents%20and%20Settings/user/My%20Documents/Downloads/brma98ce.pdf 
9 OECD, Reducing The Thickness Of Borders To Promote Trade And Participation In Global Value 
Chains, An Issues Paper, 2012,  Retrieved from: www.oecd.org/dac/aft/ReducingtheThicknessofBorders.pdf 
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factors of production. These tools take a variety of forms. According to Evans 
(2003), there are three groups of factors that can create restrictive border effects. 
Each of them has varying economic consequences. The first is a high elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and imported products. Second, transaction costs 
of doing business abroad and domestically differ from each other. Third, bilateral 
trade barriers between two countries tend to create obstacles to trade. 
 In the first case, the degree of the border effect is related to a high degree 
of similarity between imports and domestic goods. In the second case, the price 
differential reflects transaction costs related to varying business procedures and 
regulations on export and imports, customs, transportation as well by the cost of 
doing business in a cultural environment where border effects arise. In the third 
case, border effects are frequently driven by tariff and non-tariff measures Evans 
(2003).  Tariffs create a wedge between internal and external prices, frequently 
with the protectionist intentions. Non-tariff barriers often have the same or worse 
effect. The latter is a broad category of barriers and comprises technical stan-
dards, SPS, licensing and certification requirements, health and safety regula-
tions, border formalities, government procurement practices, etc.  
 According to Anderson & Wincoop (2001) tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
can be referred to as rent-bearing barriers as they create rents from private be-
neficiaries. There are also non-rent bearing border barriers such as language, 
cultural and institutional barriers that also affect trade and economic activities.  
In addition to direct trade policy measures such as tariffs and non-tariff 
measures, there are other factors which determine the effectiveness of countries 
involvement in trade. They are classified by Wilson et al. (2004) into two broad 
categories: “border” barriers such as port efficiency and customs administration 
as well as “behind-the-border” barriers such as the quality of infrastructure and a 
regulatory environment. The latter may not be directly related to national borders 
and act inside a country. 
 Borders create two types of costs: transaction costs and costs related to 
tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Anderson &Wincoop (2001) found out that the smal-
ler the country the larger is the fraction of its output exposed to trading costs. 
Protection thickens borders more for the small than the large country. From this 
point of view the significance of borders can vary for Georgia and the EU as for 
trade partners of non-proportional sizes. The analysis of trade flows shows that 
the European Union is Georgia’s largest trade partner and the second largest 
export partner taking a 30% share in Georgia’s total exports. The first place as an 
export partner is occupied by the CIS region with 36%10. Obviously the geogra-
phical proximity with this region as well as historically established trade and eco-
nomic ties play an important role. At the same time the EU enlargement series 
brought its border closer to Georgia. Despite this territorial proximity the volume 
and composition of trade flows show that Georgia is still a less important trade 
partner for the EU, compared with other EU neighbouring countries.  
 
 
 
                                                          
10 www. geostat.ge 
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Table 1. Georgia−EU Trade Dynamics  
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Trade turnover (million 
US dollars) 
1.736 2.477 2. 780 2.879 2.990 
Exports 297 424 353 608 621 
Imports 1.439 2.053 2.427 2.271 2.369 
Annual percentage 
change 
13% 41% 12% 3% 4% 
Exports 25% 46% -17% 72% 2% 
Imports 10% 40 % 18% -7% 4% 
Share in Georgia’s total 
trade turnover 
26% 27% 27% 27% 26% 
Share of Exports in total 19% 19 % 15% 21% 22% 
Share of imports in total 28% 29% 31% 29% 28% 
 
Source: Ministry of Economy and Sustainable Development of Georgia. 
 
Currently, Georgia’s trade turnover with the EU-member states amounts to 
27% of the country’s total trade turnover. As shown by the table 1 data Georgia is 
mainly an importer from the EU. Trade structure shows an unbalanced picture. To 
compare with 1995 data, the share of the EU in Georgia’s trade has increased from 
8.7% in exports in 1995 to 15% in 2012. The share in imports is stable around 31% 
in both periods. The sectoral composition of Georgia’s export has not changed much 
over time.  Mineral and agricultural products take the largest share in it. In 2010 the 
two largest exported commodity categories _ nuts and mineral fertilizers took almost 
70% of all exports within the GSP+ scheme. The indicator was about 84% in 2011 
and 73% in 2012. The majority of exported products was classified as sensitive by 
the GSP+ framework and was not subject to significant tariff reductions. 
  Georgia in the framework of WTO accession significantly dismantled trade 
barriers and lowered tariffs to reasonably low levels. By the WTO 2012 data MNF 
trade weighted average tariff rate is 1.9% with a bound rate of 7.4%11; 96.4% of 
manufacturing tariff lines and 41.8% of agricultural tariff lines are free of duty (at the 
6 digit level of the Harmonized System).  In terms of these criteria, Georgian fore-
ign trade regime remains one of the most liberal in the region. Export policies in 
Georgia are also highly liberalized. There are no export taxes. The number of 
export documents, time to export (9 days) and nature of export procedures are 
close to average OECD indicators.  However, costs to export 1,355 US dollars per 
container are higher than the OECD average (1,080.3 dollars per container), but 
much lower than in Europe and Central Asia (2,154.5 dollars)12. Analysis of  recent 
practitioners and expert evaluations shows that the main challenge Georgian 
exporters are facing in the EU market is high formal trade barriers, especially non-
                                                          
11 https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/statis_maps_e.htm 
12 Doing Business 2015, World Bank. 
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tariff ones, including technical standards and regulations which are a major impe-
diment for Georgian export industries. 
To examine Georgia’s relative performance in its major export markets, inc-
luding the EU, Athukrala &Wagle analyzed trade data using the gravity modelling13. 
They revealed that Georgia under-exports to the major European economies like 
France, Germany Italy and the United Kingdom notwithstanding the GSP+ trade 
preferences offered by the EU. In 2010 the number of exported product categories 
was 35, while in 2011 – 39. Considering that the GSP+ scheme covers 7200 pro-
ducts, Georgia evidently underemployed its opportunities.  
Apparently, there are two reasons for that. First, Georgia has not been suc-
cessful in implementing an effective export diversification strategy and therefore is 
weak to establish itself in the EU market. The second reason is related to the reluc-
tance of the EU to further liberalize its border and behind-the-border barriers.  
EU countries according to customs union rules have common tariffs and for the 
two last decades have been very active in promoting trade liberalization towards 
other trade partners. Therefore the EU represents the best example of pursuing 
‘deep’ integration through liberalization of trade and investment and harmonization 
of economic policy. However recent studies show that its protectionist efforts inten-
sified after the 2008-09 global crisis. The number of restrictive trade measures 
significantly exceeded the number of trade liberal or neutral actions made by the 
EU14. The same study showed that the total number of behind-the-border measu-
res amounted to 237 for the EU countries, this exceeded non-tariff border measu-
res which amounted to 6315. Evidently before signing the Association Agreement 
Georgia had more liberal trade with the EU, than the EU with Georgia.   
The DCFTA as a step taken towards further opening EU markets for Georgia 
can be an important impulse for enhanced economic cooperation.  Since the imple-
mentation of the DCFTA on 1 September 2014, Georgia's exports to the EU have 
increased by 7% for September-December 2014, compared to the same period in 
2013 (European Commission, 2015). As a result of full implementation of DCFTA 
Georgia and the EU will eliminate duties on 100% and 99.9% (in trade value), re-
spectively, of their imports from the other party. For industrial goods, the DCFTA 
involves the immediate removal of import duties on both sides. Trade in agricultural 
products will be also fully and immediately liberalized with minor exceptions16.  
 The study on the impact of the EU-Georgia DCFTA conducted by the Cen-
tre for Social and Economic Research (CASE) and Ecorys in 2012 focused on the 
costs and benefits of the DCFTA, states that after full implementation of the 
DCFTA, Georgia’s GDP could increase by 4.3% and 6.5% over the long term.  
In the next five years, Georgia’s export will increase by 12% and imports from the 
EU will increase by 7.5%17.   
                                                          
13 P. Athukorala, S. Waglé, Export Performance in Transition: The Case of Georgia, “Working Paper“, 
 No. 2/2013. 
14 M. Wajda-Lichy M., Traditional Protectionism versus Behind-The-Border Barriers in the Post-Crisis 
Era: Experience of Three Groups of Countries: the EU, NAFTA and BRICS, “Journal of International 
Studie”, Vol. 7, No 2, 2014,  pp. 141-151.  
15 Ibidem. 
16 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/documents/eap_aa/dcfta_guide_2014_en.pdf 
17 Trade Sustainability Impact Assessment in support of negotiations of a DCFTA between the EU and Georgia 
and the Republic of Moldova. 2012.  http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/november/tradoc_150105.pdf 
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Trade-related Institutional Reforms  
 
According to Scott (2015) the ‘politics of borders’ is an integral part of the 
European Union’s project of integration, enlargement and regional cooperation, this 
is also reflected by the formal cooperation instruments. The development of these 
instruments between Georgia-and the EU started in 1992. In 1996 Partnership and 
cooperation Agreement was signed which provided wide-ranging cooperation in 
the areas of political dialogue, trade, investment, economic, legislative and cultural 
fields. In 2004 Georgia was included in the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
and the EU – Georgia ENP Action Plan was adopted in 2006.  Georgia is also a 
part of the EU’s Eastern Partnership (Eap), launched by Poland and Sweden in 
2009 to deepen bilateral and multilateral engagement with Europe’s Eastern ne-
ighbourhood. The EaP played an important role in the acceleration of visa facilita-
tion and association agreements, leading to completion of the Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Agreement.  
Although the EU has been clear that EaP does not offer membership pro-
spects to its eastern neighbors18, overall, ENP and the Action Plan (AP) strengthe-
ned the institutional cooperation between the EU and Georgia. The EU’s engage-
ment in Georgia’s institutional development has been significantly stronger under 
the EaP compared to the previous period of EU-Georgia cooperation in the three 
priority areas (TBT, SPS and competition policy) for which Georgia developed 
“comprehensive strategies” and started their implementation19. The  DCFTA as the 
most important policy instrument of the EaP offered to Georgia,  a new mechanism 
with major focus  on the reforms related to trade and economic fields. 
The Association Agreement, visa liberalization, and the Deep and Compre-
hensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA) are considered important achievements and 
necessary steps to full integration with the EU20. Progressive liberalization of trade 
and further reforms in the areas of competitiveness, enforcing investors’ protection, 
strengthening the role of small local producers, raising production standards and 
consumers’ safety are at the agenda.The EU provided substantial assistance to 
Georgia which has significantly increased in the period 2014-2017, with up to €410 
million available to support the political, judicial and economic reforms envisaged in 
the Association Agreement21. 
The EU promotes policy convergence in its neighborhood and in Georgia by 
two main approaches The first is “external governance” implying expansion of its 
aquis communautaire by the EU. The second is “Europeanization beyond the EU” 
through which the EU promotes legislative, regulatory and policy approximation 
(Sierra, 2010). Lack of harmonization of trade-related institutions, regulations and 
practices increase the economic significance of borders as an impediment to trade 
                                                          
18 C. Morari, European Integration of Georgia And The Republic of Moldova: Evolution and Prospects. Seventh 
Framework Programme Marie Curie Actions People. International Research Staff Exchange Scheme (Delive-
rable Draft), 2013, Retrieved From: https://eupreacc.files.wordpress.com/2013/06/pdf11.pdf 
19  Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan for 2012 in Georgia in Trade and 
Some Trade Related Areas Assessment of Civil Society Representatives (Report Summary) retrieved 
from: http://www.epfound.ge/files/report_final_eng.pdf 
20 T. Khidasheli, Georgia’s European Way, 2011, Retrieved from: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/ipg/2011-
3/09_khidasheli.pdf  
21 http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/georgia/documents/newsletters/trade_2015/trade_insight_8_en.pdf 
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cooperation.  From the trade viewpoint greater permeability of borders requires that 
reforms go beyond tariff and non-tariff liberalization and cover specific trade facilita-
tion measures. At present experts identify two major concerns: reforms in the infra-
structure and regulation related to border crossing and a need for a regional 
approach to trade facilitation (Baindurashvili, 2013). Effective bi-lateral cooperation 
is needed in the areas of technical regulations, metrology, market surveillance, ac-
creditation, conformity assessment procedures, food safety standards, customs 
procedures, rules of origin, anti-circumvention mechanisms and other technical 
areas which are related to the movement of cross-border flows of goods and servi-
ces. 
Georgia’s trade and economic integration with the EU appears weak by the 
European Integration Index, which is a helpful indicator to evaluate a country’s 
performance progress in relationship with the EU. It evaluates linkages (including 
trade and economic ties), approximation between the institutions, legislation and 
practices as well as management of the integration process. In 2012 Georgia had 
the highest score among Moldova and Ukraine for trade in goods with the EU and 
demonstrated the best business climate. As for the linkages component, Georgia 
was the third best performer and the second by the approximation component. The 
Index also reveals that Georgia has the least numbers of mutual trade barriers with 
the EU. Overall in 2013 it maintained the position of the second best performer and 
continued to improve its position in 2014. However, it could not improve substan-
tially its linkage position. The progress is shown in table 2.  
 
Table 2. Georgia’s EU Integration Index 
 
 2012 2013 2014 
Linkages 0.51 0.53 0.59 
Approximation 0.60 0.63 0.69 
Management 0.51 0.58 0.74 
 
Source: The European Integration Index for Eastern Partnership Countries 
 
In addition to the formal barriers there can be informal barriers related to be-
liefs and attitudes. The relationship between the EU and Georgia mostly evolved at 
the ‘elite’ and to some extent at the „intermediary” (civil society) levels, while these 
channels were poorly developed at the wider ‘societal’ leve22l (Khuntsaria, 2014). 
This can partly explain the recent trend of a slight decrease in trust in the EU and 
an increase in distrust.  In 2008 trust was 64%, while by 2013 it has dropped by  
16 percentage points which is a sign of a more ambivalent attitude towards the EU 
appears to have emerged in 2012 and 201323. This ambivalence can have its re-
flection in trade and economic relations, therefore a more comprehensive analysis 
is needed of how to reduce formal institutional, and as well as informal institutional 
differences.  
                                                          
22 T. Khuntsaria, External Democracy Promotion in Georgia: The Role of The European Union, 2014, 
retrieved from http://css.ge/files/PhD%20dissertations/PhD_Thesis_Summary_-_Tamar_Khuntsaria.pdf 
23 Expectations and the EU Association Agreement http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27501 
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Conclusion 
 
The borders in Georgia-EU trade relations involve many restrictive measu-
res and policies comprising both non-tariff and regulation and institutional barriers.  
Therefore the permeability of borders is still low.  Despite a broad liberalization 
path, the EU maintains high non-tariff and behind the border barriers which raise 
the restrictive significance of borders.  The restrictive role of borders is higher for 
Georgia than for the EU.  The reason for that is Georgia’s minor share in the EU’s 
total trade (0.1%), while the EU is the first trade partner of Georgia. In addition to 
that Georgia liberalized its trade earlier and to a greater degree, towards the EU, 
than vice versa.   
As a result of the enlargement processes the geographical border of the EU 
got closer to Georgia. That is an additional trade facilitation factor. However, the 
EU is primarily an institution rather than mere geographic territory. Therefore re-
duction of institutional differences is more important. Trade policy in Georgia 
should be discussed as part of broader institutional changes. Georgia should go on 
trade policy reforms designed to strengthen harmonization with the EU, because 
full realization of the profits from bilateral trade depends on the pace of convergen-
ce and the removal of institutional borders.  
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